A fortnightly column on the high politics of the Af-Pak region, the fulcrum of global power play in India’s neighbourhood
Obama and Pak
Pakistan’s strategic community was among the least enthusiastic in the world about Barack Obama’s re-election as president of the United States. This is not surprising, for few American leaders have played such hard ball with Pakistan as Obama.
In raiding Osama bin Laden’s hideout without informing Rawalpindi and relentlessly raining drones on terror sanctuaries in Pakistan’s western borderlands, Obama had made himself quite unpopular with the army and its proxies in Pakistan.
Obama also called Rawalpindi’s bluff on denying America overland access to Afghanistan through Pakistani territory. While the alternative routes to supply US troops in Afghanistan were expensive, Washington demonstrated that it has other options.
The confrontation and recrimination of the last two years between Washington and Rawalpindi need not necessarily be a guide to US-Pakistan relations in the second term.
For its part, the Obama administration wants to renew the engagement with Pakistan. Rawalpindi’s support is critical in ensuring an orderly US military exit from Afghanistan. Even more important, without the Pakistan army’s cooperation, the US can’t bring stability to Afghanistan.
These important objectives are likely to drive the Obama administration to establish a transactional relationship with the Pakistan army.
Rawalpindi is much chastened after its confrontation with Obama. Rawalpindi’s claims that it could do without US support and that its alliance with Beijing would replace that with Washington has turned out to be unsustainable bravado.
Washington and Rawalpindi might have begun to dislike each other intensely over the last two years. Yet, they can’t do without each other, at least for a while longer. So long as Afghanistan remains at the top of the agenda in Washington, so will Pakistan.
Give and Take
Although New Delhi is not surprised by the renewed engagement between Washington and Rawalpindi, it would want to closely monitor the give-and-take between the two sides.
For its part, Rawalpindi claims that it has turned a new leaf, recognises the dangers of supporting religious extremism, and is willing to support political reconciliation in Afghanistan.
In return for a change of course, Rawalpindi would want something substantive from Washington. One set of its demands would be about protecting its interests in Afghanistan.
The problem is not about the principle, but the terms
in which it is framed. If Pakistan wants a friendly neighbour, the demand is entirely understandable.
What the Pakistan army wants instead is a “special relationship” that will give Rawalpindi extra-territorial privileges in Afghanistan, especially in its southern and eastern provinces dominated by the Pashtuns.
Rawalpindi has also claimed a right to intervene in Afghanistan’s internal affairs and shape its internal structures in the name of acquiring “strategic depth”.
It is this record that generates deep misgivings in Afghanistan about Pakistan’s role and concerns about how far Washington might go in its concessions to Pakistan.
For its part, Rawalpindi now claims that it is no longer interested in “strategic depth” and that it will support a political structure in Kabul that includes all elements of Afghan society and not just the Taliban.
This week, Pakistan is hosting the Afghan Peace Council that is trying to promote an understanding between Kabul and the Taliban. Rawalpindi has also begun to make contact with non-Pashtun groups in Afghanistan. All this is fine, sceptics would say. And where is the evidence of change in Rawalpindi’s mindset, they ask.
Re-hyphenation?
As the US and Pakistan reconnect, Delhi would rightly be concerned about the kind of demands that Rawalpindi might make vis-a-vis India.
Rawalpindi wants the US to supply advanced weapons systems to counter what it sees as the expanding strategic gap with Delhi. Pakistan has never made any secret of its demand for a civil nuclear initiative of the kind Washington has negotiated with India.
Sections of the establishment in Delhi are concerned that in its eagerness to win Rawalpindi’s support, the Obama administration might give away the store.
Not so fast, others would say. For the triangular dynamic between India, Pakistan and the US is no longer what it was. But there is no denying that any attempt in Washington to put the hyphen back between India and Pakistan will be deeply resented in Delhi.
In the next few months, Delhi must be prepared to leverage its growing weight in the region to shape the policy debates in Washington, Kabul and Islamabad.
Obama and Pak
Pakistan’s strategic community was among the least enthusiastic in the world about Barack Obama’s re-election as president of the United States. This is not surprising, for few American leaders have played such hard ball with Pakistan as Obama.
In raiding Osama bin Laden’s hideout without informing Rawalpindi and relentlessly raining drones on terror sanctuaries in Pakistan’s western borderlands, Obama had made himself quite unpopular with the army and its proxies in Pakistan.
Obama also called Rawalpindi’s bluff on denying America overland access to Afghanistan through Pakistani territory. While the alternative routes to supply US troops in Afghanistan were expensive, Washington demonstrated that it has other options.
The confrontation and recrimination of the last two years between Washington and Rawalpindi need not necessarily be a guide to US-Pakistan relations in the second term.
For its part, the Obama administration wants to renew the engagement with Pakistan. Rawalpindi’s support is critical in ensuring an orderly US military exit from Afghanistan. Even more important, without the Pakistan army’s cooperation, the US can’t bring stability to Afghanistan.
These important objectives are likely to drive the Obama administration to establish a transactional relationship with the Pakistan army.
Rawalpindi is much chastened after its confrontation with Obama. Rawalpindi’s claims that it could do without US support and that its alliance with Beijing would replace that with Washington has turned out to be unsustainable bravado.
Washington and Rawalpindi might have begun to dislike each other intensely over the last two years. Yet, they can’t do without each other, at least for a while longer. So long as Afghanistan remains at the top of the agenda in Washington, so will Pakistan.
Give and Take
Although New Delhi is not surprised by the renewed engagement between Washington and Rawalpindi, it would want to closely monitor the give-and-take between the two sides.
For its part, Rawalpindi claims that it has turned a new leaf, recognises the dangers of supporting religious extremism, and is willing to support political reconciliation in Afghanistan.
In return for a change of course, Rawalpindi would want something substantive from Washington. One set of its demands would be about protecting its interests in Afghanistan.
The problem is not about the principle, but the terms
in which it is framed. If Pakistan wants a friendly neighbour, the demand is entirely understandable.
What the Pakistan army wants instead is a “special relationship” that will give Rawalpindi extra-territorial privileges in Afghanistan, especially in its southern and eastern provinces dominated by the Pashtuns.
Rawalpindi has also claimed a right to intervene in Afghanistan’s internal affairs and shape its internal structures in the name of acquiring “strategic depth”.
It is this record that generates deep misgivings in Afghanistan about Pakistan’s role and concerns about how far Washington might go in its concessions to Pakistan.
For its part, Rawalpindi now claims that it is no longer interested in “strategic depth” and that it will support a political structure in Kabul that includes all elements of Afghan society and not just the Taliban.
This week, Pakistan is hosting the Afghan Peace Council that is trying to promote an understanding between Kabul and the Taliban. Rawalpindi has also begun to make contact with non-Pashtun groups in Afghanistan. All this is fine, sceptics would say. And where is the evidence of change in Rawalpindi’s mindset, they ask.
Re-hyphenation?
As the US and Pakistan reconnect, Delhi would rightly be concerned about the kind of demands that Rawalpindi might make vis-a-vis India.
Rawalpindi wants the US to supply advanced weapons systems to counter what it sees as the expanding strategic gap with Delhi. Pakistan has never made any secret of its demand for a civil nuclear initiative of the kind Washington has negotiated with India.
Sections of the establishment in Delhi are concerned that in its eagerness to win Rawalpindi’s support, the Obama administration might give away the store.
Not so fast, others would say. For the triangular dynamic between India, Pakistan and the US is no longer what it was. But there is no denying that any attempt in Washington to put the hyphen back between India and Pakistan will be deeply resented in Delhi.
In the next few months, Delhi must be prepared to leverage its growing weight in the region to shape the policy debates in Washington, Kabul and Islamabad.
